There is poignancy in books that have taken time, in which the author reflects on the reading and thoughts of many years, and attempts to see whether they can all add up and sustain hope. In a way, Bruce Mazlish began this book when he cooperated with Jacob Bronowski on The Western Intellectual Tradition (1960) (poignant for me as it was the book in which I discovered there might be such a thing as an intellectual tradition). He went on to publish wide-ranging books, which are inappropriately assessed by narrow academic criteria. He has speculated on shifts in consciousness in The Fourth Discontinuity (1993) , about the information technology revolution, and -most recently -on globalization. In The Uncertain Sciences he gathers his thoughts under the rubric of the human sciences in order to shape a picture, and propose a future, for the knowledge that we have of ourselves. This future, he argues, lies with a shift in human consciousness towards the situation in which the human sciences become the knowledge of a self-recreating human community. With this he wants to face the pessimism of the late 20th century.
The human sciences can develop only by humans becoming conscious of the ongoing achievements of the human sciences. By becoming conscious, I mean not only possessing ourselves of the existing state of knowledge but being willing to act on, and live in terms of, that knowledge. In short, we must become a community of human scientists. (175) This book, then, is synthetic, short on detail and analytic precision but big on significant themes; as Mazlish avers: 'The originality, I hope, lies in the whole' (3). It is a book to reflect on, to argue with and -if one can -to move beyond. It is written accessibly for a wide audience, but with extensive notes and a critical bibliography, which opens up a huge literature. At his best, Mazlish pitches his writing just at the right level to carry a general theme and at the same time include sufficient historical sense to give this theme a grounding in a concrete world. He tries to orient himself and his readers in relation to the turbulent controversies of academic life, especially the conflict between the humanities and natural sciences absurdly hyped as the culture wars. His style is open to argument, and indeed this openness is intrinsic to the nature of the enterprise he thinks the human sciences must be. He places great weight on the scientific method as the basis for unity in the sciences; but, I suggest, in practice this method turns out to be the kind of civil conversation to which a book like this one contributes.
Mazlish would like to see institutional support for the development of a field called the human sciences, linking the natural and social sciences, and drawing on and informing much of the humanities. While he does not envisage this as a possibility in the short term, this book is in its way an attempt to construct the blueprint of such a field. The ambition is 'to link the human and the natural sciences . . . [and to] explore the possibilities of drawing the humanities within the orbit of the human sciences and, reciprocally, bringing the human sciences more securely into the circle of the more philosophical humanities' (6). His cause is the universality of scientific method as the means to realize objective knowledge, directed to the subject-matter of the humanities (which includes the qualitative riches of the world as subjectively experienced) as well as to the material biological and social dimensions.
Where Mazlish does suppose that the human sciences differ from the natural sciences is in relation to the reflexive quality of human life. The development of knowledge changes the human subject, and knowledge is not fixed but emerges 'in response to different circumstances' (3). Thus, advocacy of the human sciences is also advocacy of a way of life. This gives to the book a concluding crescendo, which ends with the argument that the development of the human sciences is bound in a reflexive circle with the development of a new human consciousness. Uniquely among the different sciences, the future of the human sciences requires the expansion of humanity as a whole into a community of scientists -human scientists. 'The human sciences need humanity as their community. But they don't have it ' (201 flourish only with the support of the human sciences. This argument contains a utopian vision, but it is one that Mazlish uses, with belief in the phenomenon of globalization in mind, to suggest the direction in which a rational rather than despairing approach to the future lies. On my reading, the book is a gentle reassertion of the Enlightenment project, a declaration of faith in a way of life even when faced by all the critical deconstruction, let alone violent destruction, of the late 20th century.
The very broad theme is supported by a number of steps. Mazlish first examines the human sciences (effectively sociology, anthropology, economics, political theory and history; nothing is said about psychology or linguistics) in order to assert that, however qualified or 'uncertain' their results, they, as much as the natural sciences, deploy 'the scientific method' and achieve objective knowledge. 'The unity of science does exist. . . . The scientific method can be defined, at a minimum, as being based on the willingness of witnesses to accept public forms of verified experience, acceptable means of logical thinking, and a code by which theory and data can be related and played back against one another' (65). This reference to 'the scientific method' is initially puzzling, since few natural scientists themselves seem to believe any longer in the scientific method, which could be formally specified, and even philosophers of science, in response to Feyerabend's onslaught and the work of historians and sociologists of science, have shifted to other terms with which to discuss the rationality and objectivity of science. But this book is searching for a way in which to assert the unity of objective knowledge, and to argue that the human sciences are 'sciences' even though their subject-matter includes the emergent, non-reducible properties of humans as symbolizing beings -history, culture and the arts.
Whether or not there are agreed 'public forms of verified experience', the 'acceptable' means of reasoning, and the 'codes' linking theory and observation, would seem to be the points at issue in recent controversies about science as uniquely rational activity. In asserting that there are such realities, Mazlish is trying to escape from the judgement that the subject-matter of any human science or humanities discipline requires a distinction between sciences and non-sciences. He rejects claims that the disciplines are divided by subject-matter because, more importantly, they are united by method. The implication is that the current opposition of 'the sciences' and 'the humanities' is false and bridged by the human sciences. Whatever the difficulties, I take Mazlish to be equating 'scientific method' with 'rationality', understood as the integration of individual reason in a community open to free and critical evaluation of evidence and coherence. References to Habermas's idea of a truth community, the formation of scientific communities around gentlemanly conduct in the 17th century, and the perspective gained from travel and encounter with the other, point to the character of such an integration. This is the way, I think, to make sense of the claim that 'there is only one way of thinking scientifically, whatever the field' (13), and that it is the application of this way of thinking ('scientific method') that makes knowledge cumulative and progress real. Indeed, while he tries to be polite, Mazlish is appalled by the perpetuation of superstition (belief in extra-terrestrials is a pressing American case) in the modern world, and he imagines a human science community as a model for a more enlightened society. Similarly, he sees no place for any religion that advances truth-claims about the world.
To deal with debates about whether 'the uncertain sciences' are sciences, and to undermine barriers between the natural sciences, the social sciences and the humanities, Mazlish includes two long chapters under the headings of 'positivism' and 'hermeneutics'. These chapters deploy historical material to support the argument, not to be systematically historical. Once again, the purpose is to demonstrate the unity of objective methods, though I think here he collapses past debates about the separation of the Naturwissenschaften and Geisteswissenschaften on grounds of distinction of methods and grounds of distinction of subject-matter and hence forms of knowing. But certainly the human sciences need knowledge of the material dimensions that 'positivism' provides, and it is easy to show how widely the natural sciences use 'hermeneutic' methods. There is a special sympathy for Francis Bacon and J. S. Mill, both of whom sought in common methods the unity of the natural and moral sciences.
Significantly reflecting current intellectual pressure, above all in Cambridge, MA, the home of the sociobiologist E. O. Wilson and the biological reductionists of Mazlish's own institution of MIT, a chapter on 'the human species' is sandwiched between those on positivism and hermeneutics. As a humanist, the author feels that he must make it clear that he too believes that the starting-point for knowledge in the human sciences is the reality of our animal nature. In consequence, however, the argument comes close to defining the human sciences as sciences by content -by their foundation on evolution theory -not method. As I argue in a moment, the book does not take account of the possibility of different forms of knowledge for different ends.
I was unclear what this chapter achieved. But an anecdote may illuminate the social context in which the chapter seems to have been written. At MIT, I heard a lecture by a highly successful software entrepreneur, predicting future innovations. Asked a question about how this might benefit the majority of the world's peoples, he dismissed ethical discourse as an ephemeral feature of media interest. The majority of the world's peoples are losers, of no interest, not where the action is. The action is the next stage of engineering for profit.
A chapter, directed at sceptics, is included to show that there is some, if limited, cumulative knowledge in the human sciences. The approach is very broad-brush, citing, for example, the spread of belief in an evolutionary ancestry, and Adam Smith's provision of concepts appropriate for the analysis of commercial society. This may ignore the small but significant ways in HISTORY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES 12(3) 142 which the social sciences, though certainly failing to make predictions, still succeed in circumscribing the range of what are thought to be reasonable responses to small-scale questions and changes, often in the area of policy and administration. It is, after all, not in question that the psychological and social sciences have made 'progress' in the sense that, in the 20th century, they have in liberal democracies become constitutive of large areas of government and (reflexively) self-government. Further, the belief that the application of objective methods makes possible the accumulation of knowledge suggests that it is indeed possible to identify 'science' with a body of knowledge, the knowledge that the method is supposed to have made possible (of evolution, of the market). If this is so, to claim the unity of the sciences is to claim something of substance ('truth') as well as to claim unity of method.
The conclusion of the book is devoted to the future of the human sciences, and this is where the argument envisaging humanity as the necessary community for human science comes in. He would like to have hope for the evolution and spread of a new human consciousness, analogous to the new consciousness described by Hans Blumenberg as the accompaniment of the Copernican revolution. The author knows well how speculative this will all seem to some. But what, he asks, is the alternative -postmodern nihilism, superstition, unfettered markets? This is the Enlightenment voice: let us converse, let us take courage from what has been done, let us find the way so that new knowledge can make us new people, let us enact a community open to truth.
What is there to say in response, if we do not fall back on discipline-bound repudiation of such ambitions (and, as Mazlish rightly observes, 'although lip service is often given to . . . [interdisciplinary] procedure, in practice there is much resistance' [5])? Much of the argument is open to criticisms long levelled at both the Enlightenment project and the politics of liberal individualism of which it is often thought to be the ideology. There is, for example, a remarkably curt footnote dismissing 'power' as an analytic category; but whatever the difficulties of conceptualizing power, the category is precisely one of the ways that the human sciences have shifted our consciousness of what politics, both in theory and in practice, is about. This is surely a reason for the recurrent political unpopularity of the human sciences, not least in academic circles that think they can find a vantage point outside of the political process. Similarly, however liberal and open the author's own attitude to non-western belief systems, the logic of his position appears to require the understanding of those belief systems by the western human sciences. And if the argument is anti-relativist about knowledge, it is anti-relativist about forms of life. Whether an envisaged community can hold together common rationality but diverse ways of life is open to question.
I should like to focus on one question, on which Mazlish constantly touches but which he does not confront at length. This is the question of values. It is only by understanding reference to the scientific method as advocacy for an ethic of a particular way of life that I can grasp it as an imperative. This ethic has many of the liberal virtues articulated by J. S. Mill, and Mill, of course, believed that ethical judgements could be grounded on utilitarian principles. But Mazlish, however sympathetic he may be to the use of such principles in practical decisions, does not ultimately take this route. The virtue of the members of his utopian community of human scientists lies with their openness to reason, and by implication openness to the truth, rather than solely in benefits to happiness and order. He values the humanities because they enable us 'to go beyond positivism by studying the experience that all humans have of what it is to be human' (66), and in that 'experience' he includes qualitative values like 'depth'. This is a strongly non-utilitarian value. His view of the human sciences as a search for 'the experience that all humans have' exposes a rich vein of humanism and an assumption that progress can indeed be measured against the spread of a humanistic consciousness.
In the two chapters that compare the natural and human sciences through the history of 'positivism' and 'hermeneutics', the stress is on methods; but the substantive debate has historically been about what is thought essential to the distinction of subject-matter, even ontology. It was the presumed status of Man as an intrinsic value which underlay the arguments of philosophers like Dilthey, Windelband and Rickert who distinguished the methods of Natur-and Geisteswissenschaften. The existence of values in the human sphere led them to consider the conditions for different forms of knowledge; only secondarily did they consider the methods appropriate to these forms of knowledge. In the words of Gadamer: 'The difference that confronts us is not in the method but in the objectives of knowledge' (Gadamer, 1998: xxix) . Re-expressed in a less idealist idiom, the point is to consider whether the appropriateness of a method must be judged by the purpose for which knowledge is sought. We must first agree that there are universal values, giving an essential purpose to all ways of life, if we are to believe that all knowledge can be sought by a common method, and hence that the sciences can be unified. Rhetorically, such universal values are 'truth' and 'human rights'. But we are all too well aware that there are many local contexts, even in the sciences, where these values simply are not those that guide the purposes for which knowledge is sought; or we are aware that these values are too vague or manifold for there to be agreement as to what they mean in practice. There seems to be no escaping some kind of theory that links individual and collective purposes, power and knowledge -the kind of theory that was once discussed with reference to the concept of ideology.
I take one much discussed but obviously central example: representation of Freud's theory of psychoanalysis. Sometimes there is interest in psychoanalysis as a contribution to natural science -the English translators who HISTORY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES 12 (3) 144 worked on the Standard Edition of Freud's writings wanted integration with psychiatry, some psychologists wanted to test the theory experimentally, and Frank Sulloway wanted to demonstrate its roots in evolutionary theory. In other settings, there is interest in psychoanalysis as a discourse in the humanities, as narration that creates both self-representations and therapeutic avenues for clients. There are, clearly, 'positivist' and 'hermeneutic' possibilities in Freud. No claim about the authority of one approach can stand independently of a claim about the purposes, or values, implicit in one form of knowledge rather than another. The Freud case is exceptional only to the extent to which the values instantiated in different readings are visible, however much the rhetoric of justification stresses the empirical facts.
As a side point, but one not without force, I observe that it is often impolite, even aggressive, to point out values, as this points to the particular circumstances of social groups or individual scholars. If it is apparent at present in the human sciences that 'there is neither a sufficiently agreed-upon scientific method nor a scientific community committed to its clear procedures ' (99) , this is because interests and purposes differ. By what political means, except under authoritarian diktat (perhaps diktat of 'the market') will our purposes coincide and hence make possible the unification of our sciences? Mazlish's hope is that we will find a common commitment in our common humanity.
A similar point about values can be made in a different way. Mazlish writes: 'The starting point for the human sciences must be Homo sapiens as an animal' (68), and elsewhere he refers to the subject-matter of the human sciences as 'the human species'. This has the appearance of simple common sense, though it perhaps also represents the effort by a scholar in the humanities to distance himself from wild postmodernists whom his biologist colleagues believe reduce even death to discourse. Once, however, he writes about 'a human being ' (137) . This apparently trivial difference in usage appears to symbolize a confusion of purpose. It is not clear that 'animal nature' rather than 'being' must be the basic presupposition of the human sciences; indeed, the judgement would appear to preclude activity in the human sciences devoted to understanding the representation of Man as 'animal' or 'being'. But for Mazlish, this representation of Man as animal is a factual achievement, and as such it must be the base on which to build future research. Here, however, he agrees with the 'positivism' which elsewhere he is keen to enrich with the purposes of the humanities. The same concession to 'positivism' is apparent in his claim that the human sciences create one part, and we may dream one day the whole, of humanity as a new 'species'. The slip into biological metaphor is gratuitous (presumably human scientists and everybody else will still form an interbreeding population with fertile offspring!) as a way to describe a shift, however large, in historical consciousness. others value the humanities, though much more the arts themselves, because they provide a rhetoric of 'depth'. But it does not seem to me that they do so as part of any science. Mazlish's project for the human sciences can assert but it cannot articulate the grounds for values. In this he might be thought to be in good, and if not in good, in plentiful company.
How then can the human sciences, envisaged as an enlightened community, represent 'depth' or values? It is perhaps telling that Mazlish's clearest illustration of 'depth' is a personal one of being moved by music. But what are our collective values and on what grounds are they to be argued for? Perhaps 'truth' itself? Much is implicit in the discussion, and perhaps this is the only way forward.
Humanity shares a historical consciousness from which, with increased self-consciousness, it draws its values. On this basis, humankind seeks to understand itself. Understanding interacts with unintended consequences and forms the phenomena that the human sciences attempt to comprehend. In this strange, uncertain, and unexpected manner, humanity begins to resemble a scientific community adequate to the demands placed upon it by the nature of the human sciences. (228) Mazlish suggests that our accumulated knowledge of history 'deepens knowledge. It incorporates a way of seeing scientific connections among phenomena that would otherwise appear chaotic. It assuages our sense of what Adam Smith called wonder ' (180) . And in conclusion, he returns with hope to an enlightened humanism. But we are still left with the point, made painfully by Dostoevsky, Nietzsche, Max Weber and others, that such a humanism, here embedded in a plea for the human sciences, does not have the possibility of providing a foundation for its own values. Dostoevsky's answer is not open to Mazlish because he ultimately equates religious commitment and ignorance (here he is 'positivist'); Nietzsche's answer is not open to him because he fears an intolerable relativism (here he would seem to accept the possibility of a transcendent 'hermeneutics'); and Weber had no answer beyond integrity. This book's answer is to recommend a way of life, and, most challengingly, to propose that this way of life is emergent in history and thus known to the human sciences, sciences which -reflexively -vivify the way of life.
